Rick Hanner

Richard is a Process Safety Group Manager for SIS Front‐End Loading at aeSolutions. He has over 25 years’ experience in chemical plant operations, process control and SIS configuration, E&I maintenance, design, and start‐ups. He is a Certified Functional Safety Expert, holds the certificate for ISA84 Expert from the ISA, and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Chemistry from the University of Georgia.

Posts by Rick Hanner:

February 4, 2020

Reducing systematic failures

Systematic failures are the result of oversights, lapses, mistakes, and decisions of not only people, but of organizations. The UK HSE showed that most accidents involving control and safety system failures were due to incorrect and incomplete specifications, or design errors. This also includes the requirements for the application program (software implementation). If the requirements […]

Read More

White Papers by Rick Hanner:

Methodologies in Reducing Systematic Failures of Wired IPLs

The history of high consequence incidents in industry reveals that most accidents were the result of systematic failures, not hardware failures.  However, a higher degree of focus in engineering is often on the quantifiable failures of hardware.  Process Safety risk gaps are often closed or reduced by several types of Independent Protective Layers (IPLs).  Two common types are Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) and Basic Process Control System (BPCS) functions.  The SIFs typically reside within a SIL-rated programmable logic controller, and their achieved quantitative performance is calculated based on random hardware failures of the SIF hardware components.  Conversely, BPCS protective layers are assigned generic industry-accepted probability of failure credits.  The BPCS generic industry-accepted probabilities of failure are conservatively assigned and consider unquantifiable human-induced systematic failures.

Richard E. Hanner – aeSolutions Greenville, SC

Tab Vestal – Eastman Kingsport, TN

Read More

Lessons Learned on SIL Verification and SIS Conceptual Design

There are many critical activities and decisions that take place prior to and during the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Verification and other Conceptual Design phases of projects conforming to ISA84/IEC61511. These activities and decisions introduce either opportunities to optimize, or obstacles that impede project flow, depending when and how these decisions are managed. Implementing Safety Instrumented System (SIS) projects that support the long‐term viability of the Process Safety Lifecycle requires that SIS Engineering is in itself an engineering discipline that receives from, and feeds to, other engineering disciplines.

This paper will examine lessons learned within the SIS Engineering discipline and between engineering disciplines that help or hinder SIS project execution in achieving the long‐term viability of the Safety Lifecycle. Avoiding these pitfalls can allow your projects to achieve the intended risk reduction and conformance to the IEC 61511 Safety Lifecycle, while avoiding the costs and delays of late‐stage design changes. Alternate execution strategies will be explored, as well as the risks of moving forward when limited information is available.

Read More