Mike has over 25 years of experience in risk analysis, safety instrumented systems and control systems engineering. He has performed conceptual design, detailed design, configuration, commissioning and startup on many projects in the process industry. Mike is a licensed Professional Engineer in four states, a Certified Functional Safety Expert (CFSE), an ISA Fellow, a voting member of both the ISA 84 and IEC 61511 committees on safety systems, chair of the ISA 84 fire & gas working group, and liaison to the America Boiler Manufacturer's Association (ABMA) and NFPA 86. Mike is co-inventor of 6 patents on safety system lifecycle tools and implementation. He has a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Maryland and a Masters of Engineering from the University of South Carolina.
Mike is an avid fisherman, and his 14 year old son is even more fanatical. Living in Alaska allows them both to feed their fishing addiction in the land of the midnight sun chasing salmon, trout, pike, and more. Mike also enjoys hunting and basketball.
(and where picking safety integrity levels on burner management systems makes sense) Safety is always a primary concern at any industrial site, and for good reason. But how much should you pay for that safety? While that question may have seemed blasphemous in days gone by, in today’s highly competitive business environment, unnecessary costs of […]
The latest 2015 editions of NFPA 85, 86 and 87 partially invoke the concepts of a Safety Instrumented System as defined by ISA S84 / IEC 61511. In the US, these standards / codes cover the majority of installed Burner Management Systems (BMS) associated with boilers, HRSGs, dryers, ovens, fluid heaters, incinerators, thermal oxidizers, etc. […]
Many plants must contend with outdated burner management systems (BMSs) on all sorts of equipment — boilers, process heaters, thermal oxidizers, incinerators, reformers, vaporizers, dryers, ovens, sulfur recovery units, kilns, calciners, furnaces, etc. Some of these brownfield installations may date back 40 years or more. Most systems originally were designed according to prescriptive standards, almost […]
This case study will discuss the application of the safety lifecycle as defined by ANSI/ISA 84.00.01‐2004 (IEC 61511 mod) to two single burner multiple fuel boilers. Each boiler is capable of firing natural gas, oil and/or waste gas, in order to supply the plant header with 1,365 psig steam at a maximum capacity of 310,000 lb/hr. The project team included the end client task force at the manufacturing facility, the engineering firm with design/procurement responsibility, the boiler OEM, the burner/gas train OEM, and the safety instrumented system consultant.
A two‐prong templatized approach to multiple brownfield burner management system upgrades can result in significant cost savings. The first step requires coming up with an equivalent design for the safety instrumented burner management system following the ISA 84 safety lifecycle, as allowed in current NFPA standards. The second step utilizes a templatization approach for multiple units with common functionality that will allow an organization to further maximize savings. Actual experience doing this on repeat BMS projects indicate the level of overall savings can be as high as 75% on the safety lifecycle, 70% on the control system design and integration, and 35% on the operation and maintenance activities. The combined overall savings are roughly 60%.
Many companies subscribe to the thought process that simply completing compliance documentation identified by IEC 61511 is the end goal. Anything more than that is deemed too tedious and represents a substantial cost center. Unfortunately, documentation is just one aspect of the lifecycle, and one that isn’t substantially making your assets safer from one day to the next. We believe the essence of the standard is to not only generate documentation, but to monitor the performance of protections layers vs. assumptions made in the front of the lifecycle. As poor assumptions are identified, companies can sustain their business by eliminating the root cause, therefore removing the previously invisible risk.
In this paper, we advocate that one should generate compliance documentation as efficiently as possible, but really focus on the impact of bad assumptions and putting a financial basis behind its meaning. This information can then be benchmarked on a monthly basis to set company targets, monitor improvement, and understand the impacts financially.
Implementing a Safety Instrumented Burner Management (SI‐BMS) can be challenging, costly, and time consuming. Simply identifying design shortfalls/gaps can be costly, and this does not include costs associated with the capital project to target the gap closure effort itself. Additionally, when one multiplies the costs by the total number of heaters at different sites, these total costs can escalate quickly. However, a “template” approach to implementing SI‐BMS in a brownfield environment can offer a very cost effective solution for end users. Creating standard “templates” for all deliverables associated with a SI‐BMS will allow each subsequent SI‐BMS to be implemented at a fraction of the cost of the first. This is because a template approach minimizes rework associated with creating a new SI-BMS package. The ultimate goal is to standardize implementation of SI‐BMS in order to reduce engineering effort, create standard products, and ultimately reduce cost of ownership.
Invoking the concept of a Safety Instrumented – Burner Management System in all three of the NFPA 85, 86 and 87 series of codes / standards is a significant milestone for industry. This paper will explain changes as they apply to the concepts of Safety Instrumented Systems and include a discussion on equivalency clauses and / or linking paragraphs to ISA S84.00.01 – 2004 (IEC 61511 Mod) possibly allowing deviation from prescriptive requirements. Modification of logic solver requirements with inclusion of a direct reference mandating the use of Safety PLCs with minimum SIL capabilities in certain instances and changes related to sensors and valve requirements will be shared. This paper will also highlight areas where the concepts of Safety Instrumented Systems in the author’s opinion have been potentially misapplied within the NPFA series.